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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

MARKMATTICE,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 991001 -CA

Priority No. 2

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This is an appeal from convictions for two counts of attempted forgery, class A
misdemeanors, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999), in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson,
presiding.1 This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e)(1996).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Was there sufficient probable cause to bind defendant over on all charges of
forgery? The determination of whether to bind a criminal defendant over for trial is a
question of law, [which the appellate court] review[s] . . . without deference to the court
below." State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9,18, 20 P.3d 300 (citation omitted).
1

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999) is attached at Addendum A.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES
No constitutional provisions, statutes or rules are determinative of this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Mark Mattice, was charged with four counts of forgery (Counts I through
IV) (R. 9-11). Following a preliminary hearing, the trial court bound defendant over on all
charges (R. 38-41; 156:1-42). Defendant moved to quash the bindover of all charges (R. 69).
Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion as to Count IV, taking the other counts
under advisement (R. 15 7:1 -14). The trial court subsequently denied the motion as to Counts
I through III (Memorandum decision, R. 108-112; Order, R. 114-15, attached at Addendum
B). Following plea negotiations, defendant pleaded no contest to two counts of attempted
forgery on Counts I and II, class A misdemeanors, and the trial court dismissed Counts III
and IV (R. 126; 129-37). The trial court accepted the plea, conditioned on defendant's right
to appeal the court's denial of defendant's motion to quash the bindover (R. 129-37). The
trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent one year prison terms on both counts, but
suspended the sentences and placed defendant on probation (R. 138-40). Defendant timely
appealed (R. 141).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2
At the preliminary hearing, William Dressen testified that a check numbered 7211 was

2

The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings.
C/ar£,200lUTl9at1fl9.
2

one of a series of checks belonging to him and his wife which were stolen from their car
along with his wife's purse on July 24, 1998 (R. 156:3-5; State's Ex. #4).3 The check was
made out to defendant for $2,500.00 (R. 72, 156:5-6). The signature on the check, which
read "William Dressen," was not his signature (R. 156:3-4). Mr. Dressen did not know
defendant, did not give him the check, and never authorized him to fill out or negotiate a
check (R. 156:4). The Dressens notified the police that the checks had been stolen. The
Dressens later learned that some of the stolen checks, with request for cash back, had
unsuccessfully been deposited to their account or had been written to various businesses (R.
156:6-7). They did not know who had taken the checks (R. 156:8).
Officer Jennifer Smartt of the South Salt Lake City Police Department investigated
the case and confirmed, contrary to defendant's assertion when he was interviewed, that the
Dressens did not run a lending business (R. 156:27-29, 32).
Jennifer Horning was assistant manager at Check City in Salt Lake City in the summer
of 1998. On September 2,1998, defendant endorsed and then presented check #7211 to her
for payment (R. 156:10-11,19-20). Also, between June 26,1998 and July 1,1998, defendant
had presented three other checks for payment at Check City (R. 156:11, 16-18). These
checks, numbered 267, 268, and 269, were made payable to defendant on the account of
Robert and Bette Johnson, in the amounts of $225.00, $269.00, and $393.18, respectively (R.

3

The forgery of the check on the Dressens' account pertains to count IV (R. 10,
11 at f 3). The forgery of the checks on the Johnsons' account, described below, pertain
to counts 1 - III (R. 9-10, 10 at t l 1 and 2).
3

37, 71-72, 156:16-18; State's Ex. #1, #2, and #3). Defendant endorsed all three checks and
had personally presented check #268 and #269 to Ms. Horning for payment (R. 71-21;
156:11-12). Check #267 and #268 were returned to Check City for insufficient funds, and
check #269 was returned with a stop payment order (156:12).
Before defendant presented the check stolen from the Dressens (State's Ex. 4), Ms.
Homing had learned that the three other checks defendant cashed at Check City had been
stolen and forged (R. 156:14).4 Although she knew that defendant might be implicated in the
passing of forged checks, she assisted him when she saw him enter Check City, hoping
Check City might recover the amounts lost from the payment of the Johnsons' checks to
defendant (R. 156:14-15). When she examined the check, she recognized that it would be
sufficient to cover the three bad checks defendant had earlier passed, but, based on her prior
experience, she asked defendant why the check had been issued to him (R. 156:15).
Defendant claimed he was doing financial consulting (R. 156:15). When she called Ms.
Dressen to verify the check, Ms. Dressen told Ms. Homing that her purse had been stolen and
that she did not know defendant or know why a check for $2500.00 had been issued to him
(R. 156:15). In response to Ms. Homing's inquiry, defendant claimed that a "friend" wrote
the check to him as a loan to buy a vehicle (R. 156:15-16). Ms. Homing then gave defendant

4

The State presented a letter and affidavits of Betty and Robert Johnson, all dated
July 29, 1998, which attested to the theft and forgery of the three checks purportedly
drawn on their account (R. 37, 156:19-20; State's Ex. #5). Defendant was not charged
with the theft of any of the four checks at issue in this case (R. 71-73).
4

an application, to stall him while she called the police. Defendant was arrested at Check City
about ten minutes later as he was still filling out the application (R. 156:16).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
Because both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have acknowledged and left
intact case law that recognizes a guilty inference from the mere passing of a forged stolen
check sufficient to survive a motion for a directed verdict, if follows, afortiorari, that the
same quantum of evidence constitutes probable cause to bind defendant over. In any event,
other evidence, beyond defendant's mere completing and passing forged, stolen checks, gives
rise to a reasonable inference that defendant completed and passed the checks at issue with
purpose to defraud.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PROOF THAT DEFENDANT PASSED A FORGED, STOLEN CHECK
IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S BINDOVER;
MOREOVER, HERE, THE PROSECUTION PRESENTED
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE
Defendant argues that the prosecution failed to produce sufficient evidence to support
his bindover on four counts of forgery. Aplt. Br. at 7-15. Because his claim fails for the
several reasons briefly discussed below, this Court should summarily affirm his convictions.

5

A. Controlling authority summarily disposes of defendant's
claim that the evidence was insufficient to support bindover.
The trial court denied defendant's motion to quash the bindover on counts I through
III on the authority of State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 223 (Utah 1985) (recognizing the
presumption of guilty intent to passed forged check upon unexplained fact that the defendant
was not a rightful payee) (Memorandum Decision at R. 110). In State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT
App. 289, 988 P.2d 949, this Court reluctantly recognized the authority of Williams in a
forgery conviction supported only by evidence that the defendant passed a forged, stolen
check:
Notwithstanding the views and concerns expressed above, we are
constrained to affirm the ruling of the trial court in the face of binding
precedent. Under current Utah law, a person who merely utters a forged
instrument can be inferred to have had knowledge of the forgery. See State v.
Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 223 (Utah 1985).
Id. at Tflf 13, 18 (denying motion for a directed verdict at close of the State's case-in-chief).
By denying certiorari review of Kihlstrom, see State v. Kihlstrom, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000),
the Utah Supreme Court tacitly declined this Court's invitation to revisit Williams. Later, the
supreme court expressly "decline[d][defendant's] invitation to reconsider Williams." See
C/ar£, 2001 UT 9.^18 n.4.
On the authority of Williams and Kihlstrom, both of which involved the sufficiency
of evidence to support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, it follows, a fortiori, that
the same quantum of evidence as in those cases was sufficient to support the magistrates'

6

decision to bind defendant over for trial in this case, discussed in detail below.5 While citing
Williams and Kihlstrom, see Aplt. Br. at 13-14, defendant has failed to alert this Court to
their central holdings, which dispose of this case. Therefore, based on controlling case law,
this Court should decline to consider defendant's claim and summarily affirm defendant's
convictions. In any event, there was sufficient evidence to support the bindover of all
charges, beyond facts merely showing that defendant cashed a forged, stolen check.
B. The evidence was sufficient to bind defendant over on all charges
under the standards articulated by the Utah Supreme Court
/. The bindover standard
"To bind a defendant over for trial, the State must show 'probable cause' at a
preliminary hearing by 'presenting sufficient evidence to establish that "the crime charged
has been committed and that the defendant has committed it.'"" Clark, 2001 UT 9 at f 10
(quoting State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995) (quoting Utah R. Crim. P.
7(h)(2))).6 "At this stage of the proceeding, 'the evidence required [to show probable cause]
5

The trial court did not simply recognize that defendant had cashed a forged,
stolen check in denying defendant's motion to quash with respect to count IV. Rather, the
court also particularly found facts beyond defendant's undisputed cashing of a forged,
stolen check on which the jury could reasonably infer that defendant knew the check was
not legitimate when he received it (R. 157:6, 13). Thus, the authority cited above
necessarily applies with the same force to count IV as it does to counts I through III.
6

Rule 7(h)(2), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, states:

If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to believe that
the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has
committed it, the magistrate shall order, in writing, that the defendant be
bound over to answer in the district court.
7

. . . is relatively low because the assumption is that the prosecution's case will only get
stronger as the investigation continues.'" Id. (quoting Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 182
(Utah 1998) (citing Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229)). "Accordingly, 4[w]hen faced with
conflicting evidence, the magistrate may not sift or weigh the evidence . . . but must leave
those tasks "to the fact finder at trial.'"" Id. (quoting State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, ffli
7,3,3 P.3d 725,728 (quoting State v. Wells, 1999 UT 27, %2,977 P.2d 1192)). "Instead,'the
magistrate must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and must
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution.'" Id. (quoting Hester, 1999 UT
27 at f 2). With the foregoing principles in mind, and after a thorough gloss of Utah case law,
the supreme court articulated the standard for determining the required quantum of evidence
to support a finding of probable cause at the preliminary hearing stage of a prosecution:
" [ A ] t . . . the preliminary hearing stage[], the prosecution must present sufficient evidence
to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant
committed it." Id. atfl6.
2. There was sufficient evidence, beyond the mere fact that defendant
cashed forged, stolen checks, to support a reasonable belief
that defendant cashed all four checks with fraudulent intent
Moreover, when viewed in a light most favorable to the State, evidence of guilt here
exceeds the mere cashing of a forged, stolen check. First, it is undisputed that defendant
signed stolen checks whose makers' signatures had been forged (R. 37,71-72; 156:3-7,1112,19-20; State's Ex. #l-#5). As to count IV (Dressen check), defendant gave inconsistent

8

answers about how he had obtained the check, first telling Ms. Horning, at Check City, that
he had been doing financial consulting, and later falsely informing Officer Smartt that the
owner of the checks were in the lending business (R. 156:15, 27-29, 32). The trial court
correctly recognized that a guilty intent could reasonable be inferred from these
inconsistencies (R. 157:13-14).
As to counts I through III, the multiplicity of checks by itself gives rise to the
reasonable inference that defendant completed and uttered them with a purpose to defraud
under "the doctrine of chances—the instinctive recognition of that logical process which
eliminates the element of innocent intent by multiplying instances of the same result until it
is perceived that this element cannot explain them all." 2 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence
§ 302 (James H. Chadbourn ed. 1979).
In sum, defendant's questionable representations about the check drawn on the
Dressen's account and the cashing of multiple checks on the Johnsons' account within days
of one another give rise to the reasonable inference that he cashed all the check with a
purpose defraud.

9

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that defendant's
conviction be affirmed.
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, the State does not request
that it be set for oral argument or that a published opinion issue.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this (?-

day of July, 2001.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General

10

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee
were hand delivered to Catherine E. Lilly and Ronald S. Fujino, Salt Lake Legal Defender
Assoc, attorneys for appellant, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111,
this (y

day of July, 2001.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

UTAH CRIMINAL CODE

76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing" defined.
( D A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any
such altered writing; or
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion,
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance
purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent or
nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a
numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an
original when no such original existed.
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, electronic storage or
transmission, or any other method of recording valuable information including
forms such as:
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks,
money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification;
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued
by a government or any agency; or
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing
representing an interest in or claim against property, or a pecuniary
interest in or claim against any person or enterprise.
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree.

ADDENDUM B

fur.- •

*•* -3
^

T,:.

:t

I'.r..

^

,

i

ivwj

- 4 t y T WK£ COUNTY

,

Dtputy C/(

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AMD FOR SALT LAXB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE MO. 981917762

Plaintiff,
vs.
MARX R. MATTICE,
Defendant.

This Court has before it the defendants Motion to Quash the
Bindover wherein the defendant was bound over to this Court for
trial on four counts of Forgery, third degree felonies* The matter
was before the Court on April 30, 1999, wherein counsel for the
State and the defendant argued their respective positions.
At the conclusion of oral argument, the Court denied the
defendant's

Motion

to

Quash

the

Bindover

as

to

Count

IV,

determining that there was sufficient evidence for purposes of
bindover to warrant the bindover in view of the defendant's
statements to a witness as to an explanation as to why he had the
check in question.
As to Counts I, II and III, the Court took the matter under
advisement to consider the oral arguments and to further review the
case law cited by the parties.

STATE V, MATTICE

PAGE TWO

MEMORANDUM DECISION

The defendant urges upon this Court a conclusion that because
the State at the preliminary hearing did not provide any evidence
to shov that the defendant vas avare that the checks he vas
endorsing vere forgeries, that the State had failed to make out the
necessary elements even for the standards required for bindover.
The evidence at the preliminary hearing shoved that the defendant
had endorsed the three checks in question by signing his true name
on the back of the check and presenting it for payment.

The

evidence also shoved that the checks that the defendant had vere in
fact forgeries.

There vas no direct evidence that the defendant

vas involved in the forgery or vas avare of the forgery.

The

defendant asserts that that is a fatal flav in the State's case for
purposes of bindover.
The State urges in the first instance that there is no such
Motion as a Motion to Quash a Bindover.
argument out of hand.

The Court dismisses that

The appellate courts of this state have

revieved issues vhere trial courts either have or have not granted
Motions to Quash Bindovers and have not taken an opportunity to
indicate

that

inappropriate.

such

a

Motion

is

nonexistent

or

othervise

In the proper case, this Court is of the opinion

that a Motion to Quash the Bindover is an appropriate Motion,

STATE V. MATTICE

PAGE THREE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

although admittedly, as the State points out, the circumstances are
rare.
Further, the State indicates that there is an inference that
the defendant was aware of the forgery or participated in the
forgery based upon his presentment of the check for payment when
there is evidence that the check was a forgery. In support of that
proposition, the State cites a number of cases which the Court has
now had an opportunity to review.

The State's position is

supported by decisions from the Utah Supreme Court, including £ £ A £ &
v. Williams, found at 712 P.2d 220 (Utah 1985).

In that case,

Williams raised the same issue folloving a conviction for forgery
that the defendant raises here, challenging the bindover.

The

Supreme Court noted in that case that there was evidence that the
checks were not authorized and were forgeries, and the Supreme
Court noted that the "defendant presented no evidence to convert
the logical inferences which could be drawn by the jury, i.e., that
without any explanation as to where he got the check or from whom,
the defendant knew the check was forged.99
That statement, as well as others by the Supreme Court,
suggests to this Court that there is a presumption in Utah law as
is discussed at 36 Am.Jur.2d §44, that there is an inference that
a person who is uttering a forged document, even by endorsing the

STATE V. MATTICE

PAGE FOUR

MEMORANDUM DECISION

forged document with one's true name, is aware that the document is
forged.

It would appear that while the cases do not suggest, and

appropriately so, that the burden of proof shifts to the defendant,
there is an obligation on the part of the defendant to overcome the
inference that he was aware that the checks were forged to provide
some explanation.
It appearing to the Court that there is an inference in Utah
law that one who endorses a check that is determined to be forged
has knowledge of the forged nature of the check and requires an
explanation on the part of the defendant, all demonstrate that the
bindover on all counts was appropriate, including the three counts
taken under advisement by this Court following oral argument.
The Motion to Quash the Bindover is denied for the reasons
above-stated.
Counsel for the State should prepare an appropriate Order
setting forth the basis upon which the Motion to Quash the Bindover
is denied, and submit the same to the Court for review and
signature*

STATE V. MATTICE

PAGE FIVE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

The Court sets this matter for trial/in July 20, 1999, and the
matter will proceed to trial, all in accordance with that setting
and on all counts in the Informatioi
Dated this //

dav of May, 1^99.

TIMOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE"

DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
HOWARD R. LEMCKE, 3729
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone. (801) 363-7900

Tnud .;u'
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No. 981917762FS

MARKR. MATTICE,

Hon. Timothy R. Hanson

Defendant.
BE IT REMEMBERED that the parties in the above-entitled action came before this
Court on April 30, 1999, to consider the Defendant's Motion to Quash Bindover. The Defendant
was before the Court on four counts of Forgery, Third Degree Felonies, having been bound over
for trial on February 5, 1999, by the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis sitting s Magistrate. Defendant
moved to quash the bindover, both sides submitted written memorandum and case law. The
Court heard argument from both parties, denied the Defendant's Motion on Count IV and took
matters of Counts I, H, and HI under advisement.
On May 11, 1999, the Court by written Memorandum Decision, citing case law submitted
by the State, including State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220 (Utah 1985), denied Defendant's Motion
as to Counts I, n, and DI.

ORDER
CaseNo. 981917762FS
Page 2

ORDER

IT IS THERTEFORE ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion to Quash Bindover is
DENIED.

,

DATED X\ase2£> day of May, 1999.
BY THE COURT:

Approved as to form:

